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Abstract This article takes the existence of power networks of
local elites as a social fact of fundamental importance and the
starting point for the study of patronage in the governance of the
coastal waters of East Kalimantan. We address the question of
how to capture the elites for project implementation, rather than
assuming the inevitability of elite capture of project funds. We
analyze the multiple-scale networks of local power holders
(punggawa) and the collaboration and friction between the
political-economic interests and historical values of local actors
and the scientific motivations of international environmental or-
ganizations. We describe how collaboration and friction between
members of the elite challenge models that categorically exclude
or co-opt local elites in foreign projects. In-depth ethnographic
study of these networks shows their resilience through flows of
knowledge and power in a highly volatile coastal environment.
Results indicate the need for inclusion in decision making of
local entrepreneurs, and – indirectly - their dependents in
decentralized coastal governance.
Keywords Elite capture . Networks .Marine conservation .
Kalimantan
Introduction
Patrons, Clients and the Governance of Local Elites
There exists an almost universal social mechanism that gives a
historical elite a prominent role in society (Esman and Uphoff
1984: 249). In the Netherlands-Indies, the Dutch administra-
tors quickly grasped the potential of the Javanese priyayi elite
by giving practical training to increase their bureaucratic ex-
pertise and skills, but within as much of an indigenous milieu
as possible. The Dutch were the patrons, the indigenous elite
the clients (Sutherland 1979: 45, 53). A patron–client relation-
ship was purposely seen by the Dutch as a one-dimensional
administrative order (ibid.). This colonial view sharply
contrasted with the multiple forms of authority that existed
then and now (Warren 1993) between local elites as patrons
and their dependents; orders of relations through multiple-
scale networks that may be social, economic, political and
cultural – often all at the same time.
Although certainly not restricted to Indonesia, the
strongly hierarchical Buginese and Makassarese societies
of southern Sulawesi provide well-known examples of pa-
tron–client relationships (Sutherland 2001; Acciaioli 2000;
Pelras 2000; Pelras 1996). In the English translation
(Chabot 1996) of his 1950 PhD dissertation Chabot al-
ready shows the historical value and the multiple social
roles of the patron as landowner, merchant, and governor
in his relationships to clients (Chabot 1996: 149–158).
Pelras’ ethnographic research of the 1960s and 1970s elab-
orates on the political aspects of the patronage of noble-
men and the ways they are able to extend their clientele.
Although the administrative role of nobility as punggawa
dwindled during the last decades of the twentieth century,
they still constitute part of the new elite, and patron–client
ties prove to be remarkably resilient not only in political,
but increasingly also in economic terms (Pelras 2000).
The patron–client relationship can be characterized gen-
erally as an unequal (but theoretically nonbinding) rela-
tionship between a superior (a patron or leader) and a
number of inferiors (clients, retainers or followers), based
on an asymmetric exchange of services, where the de
facto dependence on the patron of the clients, whose un-





1 Bogor Agricultural University (IPB), Bogor, Jawa Barat, Indonesia
2 Wageningen University, Wageningen, Netherlands
Hum Ecol (2016) 44:301–310
DOI 10.1007/s10745-016-9830-0
Published online: 24 June 2016
# The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
unpaid work, armed service, political support and other
services, is counterbalanced by the role the patron plays
as a leading figure for all the clients and by the assistance,
including monetary loans and protection, he or she pro-
vides when necessary. (Pelras 2000: 16)
Acciaioli (2000) makes a clear distinction between the fish
entrepreneur or bos in Lindu, Sulawesi from a patron
(punggawa) on the grounds that the former is a leader in the
narrowly economic sense. But in Lindu society the Bugis are a
minority of migrants (Acciaioli 2000: 224), whereas in our
case the Bugis on the coasts of northeast Kalimantan, includ-
ing Berau, have established their own settlements as fishers
and traders, in the virtual absence of more land-oriented
Dayak villages. This may account for the fact that pervasive
punggawa networks are still very much present in the Berau
coastal area among the Buginese, Makassarese, Mandarese,
and Bajau fishers and traders (Gunawan 2012; Kusumawati
2014; Pauwelussen 2015).
We regard patronage as a network emerging in the every-
day life interactions of punggawa (patrons, leaders, traders,
land/resource owners) and their clients, rather than as a one-
dimensional hierarchical structure of a patron and his depen-
dents (Chabot 1996; Pelras 1996, 2000). Both the patron and
his/her clients are embedded in multiple and multi-scalar so-
cial, economic, political and cultural relationships that make
them inter-dependent, be it in a highly dynamic context of
shifting powers and moving resources (Gunawan and Visser
2012; Kusumawati and Visser 2014; Pauwelussen 2015).
Moreover, patrons themselves may be the client of another,
higher-ranking patron in a chain of political and economic
interdependencies, in which power is not fixed but increases
or dwindles through time and space.
The integral social, political-economic and cultural quality
of the goods exchanged in patron–client relationships can be
found all over Indonesia, from Java to West Papua, where
ritual cloth (kain timur), land, and ‘development’ are ex-
changed between local elite families and the government
(Visser 1999). Here too, elites develop through historical in-
teraction with outside powers, as the Papuan elite of the late
twentieth century were the sons and grandsons of local war
lords and ritual leaders who were the leaders and teachers in
pre-colonial Papuan society (Visser 2001). They were sent to
school by the Dutch administration (1950–62) and the best
graduates were selected to become indigenous government
officials in the 1950s and the trusted brokers of development
(Olivier de Sardan 2005; Visser 2012).
The Berau district in northeast Kalimantan covers 34,
127 km2 of which 35.7 % are coastal waters (BPS Berau
2011). It is rich in forestry, mining and fishery resources
(Obidzinski and Barr 2003). Since 1999 the implementation
of decentralization in Indonesia (Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999,
and Law No. 32/2004) has resulted in a greater role for the
district government, particularly of resource-rich districts like
Berau, in managing their natural resources (Resosudarmo
2004) and gaining more political power through governing
these resources (Satria et al. 2006; Hidayat 2005; Hadiz
2004). The laws mandated that up to 80 % of natural resource
revenues be re-directed to regional governments, rather than
the 20 % prior to 1999 (Patlis 2008; Patlis 2005).
In Buginese-Makassarese societies in southern Sulawesi
and eastern Kalimantan, the tendency of members of the local
political elite to exhibit a ‘mono-centric-loyalty’ (Hidayat
2000) to their superior or boss (punggawa) or to other mem-
bers of the local elite, rather than to the community as a whole,
further strengthens the power of the district government.
Today, the sovereign positioning of the district’s political elite
implies that in every process of decision-making, priority is
given to protecting their short-term political-economic inter-
ests over longer-term social-economic and cultural interests of
the coastal communities.
In addition to their local and regional networks within
Indonesia the local elite in Berau hold long-term international
connections with patrons and Chinese traders (tauke) in
Malaysia (Casson and Obidzinski 2002; Pauwelussen 2015).
Interestingly, in their position as government officials and pri-
vate entrepreneurs, several punggawa have become involved
with global environmental organizations in the debate over and
the final establishment of the Berau Marine Conservation Area
in 2005 (Kusumawati 2014).
In this contribution to the volume we analyze patronage
networks as the property of newly emerging social, economic,
political and cultural relationships between coastal Buginese,
Butonese, Makassarese, Mandarese, Bajau and other actors.
We will focus on the political-economic role and position of
the governmental and entrepreneurial elite in their involve-
ment with foreign actors, in particular with the global environ-
mental NGOs, in the establishment of the marine conservation
area in Berau1. We do not see these networks primarily as
phenomena of the technological revolution and the global
political-economic information flows of a new economy as
does Castells (2010), although the recent availability and
widespread use of mobile phones, even in the coastal space
of Kalimantan, does indeed contribute to strengthening
existing punggawa networks. Instead, we focus on the way
these networks constitute and are constituted from the per-
spective of the everyday practice of marine conservation in
coastal northeast Kalimantan, although we do not deny that
they are part of a global economy.
Patron–client relationships, although clearly hierarchical, cre-
ate interdependency based on ‘friendship’, kinship, and alliance;
patron–client commitments that are often enduring.While clients
1 Ordinary fishers do not figure prominently in the decision-making pro-
cesses that were the focus of this research, because they depend on the
entrepreneurial elite. See also Kusumawati et al. 2013.
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are clearly kept in debt dependencies (Acciaioli 2000; Gunawan
2012), patrons also depend on their clients for cheap labor, re-
source delivery, and political support (Kusumawati et al. 2013).
Ever since the early research by Pelras since 1976 successive
anthropological studies have documented well the regional and
transnational networks of generations of punggawa who appear
to be quite resilient, shifting their influence and dominance over
time from one ‘frontier’ resource to another. Patrons as leaders
and traders often extend their networks over wide social and
geographical scales by skillfully manipulating their relationships
within Indonesia and beyond. For example, the Berau elites have
been documented to have moved from shipping and smuggling
weapons across the border into Malaysia in the 1960s to illegal
logging in the 1980–90s, long-term involvement in the turtle egg
trade and, more recently, in the era of decentralization, shrimp
aquaculture, mining and oil palm plantation, cyanide fisheries,
and the transnational trade of live reef fish and giant clams
(Casson and Obidzinski 2002; Obidzinski 2003; Gunawan
2012; Kusumawati et al. 2013; Kusumawati 2014;
SchwerdtnerMáñez and Pauwelussen 2014; Pauwelussen 2015).
Rather than assuming that Berau government officials and
private entrepreneurs negatively influence MCA establish-
ment, we favor an approach that helps to understand how
these actors who form the more advantaged class or elite
might be ‘captured’ themselves in their relationships with
global environmental actors. We think it is more relevant to
study how patrons use their power in decision-making instead
of assuming that they misuse their power in capturing the
benefits of external projects solely for personal advantage.
Moreover, we want to show how local elites themselves also
become dependents of foreign powers. Our concern in this
case is not the wise use of global donor funding, but the per-
formance of members of local political, administrative and
economic elites in the decision-making process about marine
conservation, and their impact on the effectiveness of the im-
plementation of the Berau MCA.
Alatas et al. (2013) correctly conclude that the assumption
of elite capture by foreign projects results in the marginaliza-
tion of the role of local leaders and their Blong-term effects on
institutional and bureaucratic performance^ (Alatas et al.
2013: 2). We also concur with the now widely accepted ob-
servation (Wolf 1990) that understanding power is vital in
approaching the problem of elite capture. Likewise, under-
standing punggawa networking is necessary to see how an
external project like the establishment of the Berau MCA
might ‘capture the elite’ and win them to the side of the inter-
national NGOs by taking the multiple social, economic, cul-
tural and political interests of the Berau elite seriously. With
this, we mean to study their performance to understand their
power position and the lack of effectiveness of the Berau
MCA.
Several authors have addressed the issue of inclusion or
exclusion of local elites. Working at the University of
Bradford, England, Sam Wong participated in a UNU-
WIDER project on the role of elites in economic development
to compare various so-called counter-elite and co-opt elite
approaches of international donor-driven projects. By compar-
ing these two approaches in two case studies in Bangladesh
and Ghana respectively, Wong addresses the paradox of inclu-
sion and exclusion of elites, and stresses the importance of
breaking the dependency relationships of the poor in patron–
client networks (Wong 2010: 2). Similarly, Labonte (2011)
studying the co-opting of local chiefs in international projects
in Sierra Leone, looks for a ‘solution’ proposing to mitigate
the effect of elite capture by addressing the root of their power,
namely rules about access to resources that keep the non-elite
dependent. We take the position that inclusion of the private
sector, such as the local entrepreneurial elite, is as important as
the inclusion of the governmental actors in constructing a
governance model linking local views about extraction-cum-
conservation and global conservation demands.
Methodological Considerations
This case study focuses on the culturally and historically strong
position of local economic and political elites, and their role in
the implementation of a marine conservation area (MCA) in the
Berau district of East Kalimantan. International environmental
NGOs, particularly The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and The
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), have opted for a selective
inclusion of local governmental actors and the exclusion of a
historically powerful political-economic elite (punggawa) from
the decision-making process and implementation of the Berau
MCA (Kusumawati 2014). This study of the internal dynamics
of the local elite thus challenges simplistic models of exclusion
(circumventing) or inclusion (co-opting) of local elites in project
interventions (Wong 2010).
Empirical research studying the historical underpinning
and the versatility of the everyday interactions in the network-
ing of elites is an appropriate method to overcome whatWong
states as the common weakness of both exclusion and inclu-
sion approaches: an inadequate understanding of the interac-
tions between elites and non-elites (Wong 2010: 5). He con-
cludes that: B[T]he ‘counter-elite’ and ‘co-opt-elite’ ap-
proaches should not be seen as ‘either-or’. Elites can be
absorbed and challenged in the same project at the same time^
(Wong 2010: 15). Although we agree in general, this conclu-
sion unfortunately does not bring us any closer to answering
the question of how elites are captured (historically, socially,
culturally, economically, politically, at multiple scales, and
differently through time) in order for interventionists to effec-
tively ‘capture’ the elites. Hence, in this paper we address that
very question of ‘how to capture the elite?’ We analyze the
multiple-scale networks of local power holders (punggawa)
and the collaboration and friction between the political-
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economic interests in coastal resources of government agen-
cies, private entrepreneurs, and international environmental
organizations.
In-depth and long-term ethnographic research by the first
author on these punggawa networks (Kusumawati 2014)
shows their social resilience through flows of knowledge
and power in a highly volatile coastal environment. It also
shows that the concept of ‘local elite’ is too shallow to uncov-
er the internal dynamics of the relationships between its mem-
bers, both in terms of collaboration and friction. Primary data
was gathered during field research between 2008 and 2011
(Kusumawati 2014) by observing and conducting in-depth
interviews with multiple-scale actors involved in the develop-
ment process of the marine conservation area, including na-
tional and regional government officials, local entrepreneurs,
and international and local NGO staff. Interviews focused on
the governance of the coastal area of Berau, the devel-
opment process of the Berau MCA and the history of
sea turtle management in Berau. Observations included
attendance at meetings and workshops held by the en-
vironmental NGOs in their communication (sosialisasi)
of the Berau Marine Conservation Area program to the
district government. Secondary data to complement the em-
pirical data was gathered by reviewing and examining a vari-
ety of secondary sources on the Berau MCA and on sea turtle
egg exploitation from websites, newsletters, newspaper arti-
cles and reports produced by NGOs (Kusumawati and Visser
2014; Kusumawati et al. 2013).
Elite Capture or Capturing the Elite?
Elite capture is defined as the capture of public resources by
local elites holding social, economic and political power
(Chowdhury and Yamauchi 2010). International development
organizations often assume that local elites appropriate or
‘capture’ a disproportionate part of project revenues or oppor-
tunities, resulting in the failure of development programs im-
plemented by international donors together with national gov-
ernments and NGOs, because of a lack of accountability and
transparency of project organization (Platteau 2004). As a
result, involvement of members of the local political-
economic elite in donor-funded development programs is of-
ten seen as problematic. The issue has stimulated a debate on
the inclusion or exclusion of elites from project interventions.
In this section we address two major concerns with the con-
ceptualization of elite capture: the international donors’ con-
cern with financial effectiveness, and the institutional impli-
cations of project intervention overlooking the multiplicity of
roles and positions of local elites (punggawa) as patrons of a
wider ‘community’.
TheWorld Bank and other international donor organizations
have for about two decades been concerned with the financial
effectiveness of the implementation of internationally funded
programs involving community participation (Platteau 2004).
Platteau’s research has in many ways set the tone for the intro-
duction of the concept of ‘elite capture’ in terms of the misap-
propriation of project funds by local elites in community-driven
development (Dutta 2009). The formulation of the problem
determines its solution. Once elite capture is being formulat-
ed as the problem of local elites frustrating the effec-
tiveness of international development interventions at
the expense of the targeted ‘poor communities’, this
practice needs to be mitigated. For example by condi-
tional funds release, a more active role for ‘outsiders’
in project interventions, and by fraud detection mecha-
nisms, but also by ‘disciplining’ the local elites (Platteau
2004). Interestingly, these ‘solutions’ for project inter-
ventions targeting poverty alleviation and democratic re-
source distribution seem oblivious of the societal rele-
vance of the often historical and institutional embeddedness
of multiple social, economic and political networks
connecting the elites in the public and private domains
of most of the so-called weak states where interventions
by the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund,
and the World Bank, or The Nature Conservancy and
other global and national environmental NGOs are taking
place.
In other words, local elites are captured in multiple net-
works where they are invariably the patron or the client.
Moreover, the strength of the network lies in the fact that it
involves social, economic and political relationships at the
same time, and that the one tie supports (or weakens) the other.
Regarding the local elite as captured within a political-
economic network with strong cultural and historical roots
thus demands a different approach to what has been labeled
as ‘elite capture’. Elite capture is seen as a problem particu-
larly in studies on community-driven development (Dasgupta
and Beard 2007; Saito-Jensen et al. 2010; Wong 2010; Labonte
2011). Dasgupta and Beard (2007: 232) refer to several studies
on the New Order regime of Soeharto (between 1965 to 1998)
in Indonesia and recent local politics in Java and Sumatra, and
cite Sidel’s conclusion (2004: 69–70) that Beconomic and po-
litical power differs from that of ‘local bosses’ in The
Philippines and Thailand in that it is not being consolidated in
the hands of individual strongmen or ‘dynasties’. At the regen-
cy, municipal, and provincial levels in Indonesia economic and
political power appears to be associated with loosely defined,
somewhat shadowy, and rather fluid clusters and cliques of
businessmen, politicians and officials^, and Bpower-sharing ar-
rangements, contestation between rival families and factions,
and high turnover appear to be the norm^. They found that
communities where both non-elites and elites participated in
democratic self-governance indeed demonstrated an ability to
redress capture when it occurred. A survey of 250 Community-
Driven Development (CDD) projects in Indonesia (Fritzen
2007) shows that, although the participation of non-elites is
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on the rise, elites’ control of decision-making is still pervasive
(see also Lucas, this volume).
We feel that such studies remain too much driven by a
northern, hegemonic view and expatriate concern with the
institutional norm of a Weberian transparent, democratic,
and inclusive, but narrowly defined financial accountability,
the resonance of which we find in the earlier work of institu-
tionalists. Recently such structural–institutional approaches to
project intervention have been criticized (Cleaver 2012; Li
2007). When a normative global concept like elite capture is
imposed on an Indonesian reality, the outcome may be a def-
inition like the following: BLocal elites are locally based indi-
viduals with disproportionate access to social, political or
economic power. The term elite capture refers to the pro-
cess by which these individuals dominate and corrupt
community-level planning and governance^ (Dasgupta
and Beard 2007: 230, note 1; see also Dutta 2009). This
definition is based on an extensive literature review that
seems to keep repeating these pejorative or prejudiced
terms and to primarily address the negative aspects of
local elite participation. But it disregards the multiple-
scale character of the power networks of ‘local’ elites, as
well as the connectivity of their social, cultural, economic
and political powers performing as leaders, patrons and
bosses to attract and redistribute2 external resources among
their dependents (see Steenbergen, this volume). We are
convinced that studies of elite capture should be based
on in-depth empirical research over a longer period of
time, and intimate knowledge of local power relationships
(Wolf 1990; Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013). Unfortunately,
international project staff are usually not in a position to reg-
ister and value such long-term social processes. But ethno-
graphic studies do and their empirical observations may be
used to critically discuss the legitimacy or fairness and appli-
cability of a global concept like elite capture to local condi-
tions (McCarthy et al. 2014).
Another problem is the gloss of elite capture itself.
Although observably individual actors and elites are mostly
treated as a collective entity, ‘the local elite’ is certainly not the
homogenous social category that is often described as the
subject of much elite capture literature (Chowdhury and
Yamauchi 2010). They are indeed members of a particular
social class, and they do act as the representative of a collec-
tivity, but along lines of extended families, trans-local kinship
networks, and public–private exchange relationships in which
one individual member of the elite is himself interdependent
with others, within or outside the local community, including
both clients and other patrons (Pauwelussen 2015; Gunawan
and Visser 2012; Visser 2001).
Local Elites’ Resource Management and Berau Marine
Conservation Area
In this section, wewill discuss the political and economic roles
of the local elite in managing marine resources, especially the
exploitation and trade of sea turtle eggs. This elite is actively
engaged within district and village level political networks of
Berau government, where their interests in managing marine
and coastal resources collide with the interests of NGOs who
are engaged with marine and coastal conservation in Berau.
The Berau Marine Conservation Area (Berau MCA) was
established in 2005. The process was initiated by international
and national environmental NGOs represented by the TNC-
WWF Indonesia collaboration. The model of this MCA was
based on co-management between the TNC-WWF Indonesia
and the district government in the so-called Joint Program.
Mostly the programs developed by the Joint Program
underlined the need to support the sustainable use of the
Berau marine ecosystem without targeting any specific spe-
cies. Berau waters are important to conservationists because of
their high biodiversity value, their importance in migration
routes for marine mammals and as mating, feeding, nesting
and nursing grounds of sea turtles in the so-called Coral
Triangle (Interview with ex-project leader of TNC-WWF
Joint Program, Bogor, August 2010)3. However, even though
the NGOs were not specifically targeting sea turtle, as they
used a spatial rather than a species oriented approach to con-
servation, most of the regulations issued by the district gov-
ernment regarded sea turtle protection. At the same time, the
environmentalists strongly opposed sea turtle egg exploitation
by the district government through their auctioning (lelang) of
the right to control sea turtle egg collection on the islands of
Berau by private entrepreneurs (see below).
Evidently, the exploitation of the turtle eggs has a long
history is Berau. It dates back to the colonial era when the
Dutch resident gave permits to local elite families to continue
to harvest turtle eggs according to their pre-colonial arrange-
ments, but on the condition that a percentage was earned by
the government (Krom 1940; Kusumawati 2014: 65–70).
During the New Order era (1965–1998) sea turtle eggs were
the only natural resources that could be autonomously
2 Redistribution of economic, financial and material benefits among local
elites' constituencies is beyond the scope of this article. This subject is
dealt with by Steenbergen elsewhere in this volume.
3 Although this practice has a long history in Berau, of course the big
difference is that from auctioning rights to turtle egg exploitation and
trade, the regency obtained 10-20 % of the revenues (Kusumawati,
2014 Tab. 3.1). Krom (1940) stresses the importance of the exploitation
of the Bsea turtle islands^ for state revenues, adding that BIt is important to
note that a conservation regulation was already included in the contract
between the Dutch district government and the lease-holding entrepre-
neur who was obliged to forbid any egg collection and trade during the
months of November and December .^ Also, starting in 1936, it was
included in the contract that the lease-holder should deliver to the local
government a total of 200 young turtles at the end of his term to be
released into the sea under supervision of the sub-district head at
Derawan Island. (Krom 1940: 84-85, our translation).
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managed by local people. Recently, in the era of decentraliza-
tion, sea turtle eggs have again become one of the sources of
district revenue, and are highly valued culturally as well as
economically by the Berau government and the community. In
the local and regional markets, because of their high quality,
the turtle eggs from Berau are quite expensive (10,000 IDR/
egg in 2010). Hence, as stated by one of the Joint Program
officers, ordinary and poorer people (masyarakat menengah
ke bawah) could not afford to buy sea turtle eggs. Only the
more affluent people could afford it: usually entrepreneurs or
government officials. Moreover, government officials enjoy
the privilege of receiving a share of the sea turtle eggs from
the auction (lelang) winner as an informal ‘gift’ to maintain
good relationships with the authorities (Interview with ex-
project leader of TNC-WWF Joint Program, Bogor, August
2010).
Based on Government Regulation No. 7/1999 on plant and
animal preservation, it is forbidden to use any part of the body
of the sea turtle, including the eggs. Nevertheless, using the
argument that the management of sea turtle eggs is part of
Berau’s history and that there would still remain many sea
turtles nesting on the shores of the small islands in the Berau
Delta, the district government wanted to maintain control over
the exploitation of sea turtle eggs and continued the auction of
rights to exploit sea turtle nests on islands of Berau district4.
The district government believed that they could sustainably
manage the number of sea turtle eggs traded for the sake of
district revenues. Their interpretation of ‘management’ – with
a clear economic objective – conflicted with that of the Joint
Programwho saw the management of sea turtles solely in terms
of conservation for the sake of the animals’ future existence.
The environmental NGOs in the Joint Program feared that, if
the district continued to ‘manage’ sea turtles their way, their
numbers in the Berau waters would decrease considerably over
the next ten to fifteen years. The Joint Program concluded that
the district government was after all not committed to genuine
conservation, though when they first introduced the idea, the
NGOs received full support from the district officers involved.
The conservation program aiming at improved coastal re-
sources governance in East Kalimantan was not set up as a
community-driven development project. The international en-
vironmental NGOs (TNC/WWF) did indeed hope for a more
effective intervention by bringing resource governance ‘closer
to the ground’, choosing a decentralized approach to marine
conservation by directly addressing local governance actors
(Kusumawati and Visser 2014). District government agencies
and local NGOs were selected as members of a Joint Program
decision-making body. But the local economic elite was ex-
cluded, ignoring their environmental knowledge, historical
rights and cultural values regarding resource appropriation
and distribution among their dependents. However, accusing
the aquaculture bosses and marine resources traders of frus-
trating the effectiveness of coastal management projects
makes little sense, andmay even be regarded as demonstrating
foreigners’ arrogance in failing to acknowledge the multiplic-
ity of obligations, rights and duties of these patrons or bosses
as leaders of coastal communities.
One high profile member of the Berau entrepreneurial elite
was Haji Penyu5. Haji Penyu was the last and most powerful
pachter (Dutch: lease holder) of Berau before the exploitation of
sea turtle eggs was completely banned in 2005/2006. Since co-
lonial times, and even before in 1880, there had been customary
constraints in place on the proportion of eggs that were taken by
collectors. These regulations became government mandated
(Krom 1940: 84–85; Kusumawati 2014: 66–68). For example,
it was decreed that no eggs were to be harvested during the
months of November and December. Further, as of 1936 the
leaseholder was obliged by legal contract to deliver 200 young
turtles at the end of the lease-year on behalf of the government,
which were to be released into the sea under supervision of the
sub-district’s head of Derawan Island (Krom 1940: 85).
Haji Penyu’s family held a historical position as lease-holder.
To the Berau people, he served both as an informal and a formal
leader. Formally he was head of Derawan village and he was a
businessman. His main business was the sea turtle egg trade.
With themoney collected from this business, he spread his wings
by investing in the construction sector. About sea turtle conser-
vation, he had his own opinions. According to him, the sea turtle
population was still in good condition. He still found sea turtles
swimming around the lodges at Derawan Island, even though the
sea turtles onDerawan Island had not been officially protected, at
least not until 2002. Moreover, he stated that Berau was widely
known as a producer of sea turtle eggs for regional markets, so
the claim made by environmentalists that the sea turtle was an
endangered species in his eyes only served the interests of the
scientists whoworkedwith the NGOs to justify theMCAproject
in Berau.
Haji Penyu was also an important patron and Bleading figure
for all the clients^ (Pelras 2000: 16) outside as well as inside the
local political arena. He acted as a patron of the Berau govern-
ment, as was confirmed by the ex-project leader of TNC-WWF
Joint Program who acknowledged that: Beven though Tanjung
Redeb is the capital of Berau, where the district head’s office and
4 In July 2000, the then head of the district responded to the letter written
by the Director General of Nature Protection and Conservation of the
Ministry of Forestry and Commercial Agriculture regarding the auction
of the rights to control the sea turtle islands. The district head of Berau
mentioned that Berau would like to maintain the auction despite the letter.
The rationale givenwas that auctioning also contributed to the monitoring
of the sea turtle islands. He mentioned that the monitoring done by the
BKSDAwas not effective, as evidenced by the case of stolen eggs on the
two islands controlled by BKSDA. In his response, the district head also
mentioned that the purpose of this auction system was to conserve the sea
turtle byway of the obliging the lease-holder to put aside 10% of the eggs
of the total production to be conserved. 5 Haji Penyu is not his real name. Penyu means sea turtle in Indonesian.
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the sectoral offices are located, we all know that the government
is run from Derawan^ (Bogor, August 2010). Haji Penyu had an
extensive local and regional network, including his younger
brother who was one of the vice-chairs of the Berau parliament
(DPR). His uncle had served as the head of the department of
Fisheries of Berau (DPK) from 2009 to 2012. Before his uncle
became the head of the department, this institution was actively
involved in monitoring and surveillance activities of the Berau
waters together with other Joint Programmembers. Clearly, Haji
Penyu’s institutional alliances over time influenced his political
attitude regarding conservation. Commenting on this shift of
interest away from conservation by DPK, one of its officers
stated:
DPK was involved in monitoring and surveillance activi-
ties. Butwhen the head ofDPKwas replaced [in 2009], we
were not permitted anymore to join the monitoring. The
Joint Program kept asking us to join their activities, but we
were reluctant to join them. We are under the authority of
the district government, so we have to obey them. A lot of
eyes are upon us. Whatever we do we are always wrong.
(DPK officer, Tanjung Redeb, Berau, October 2009)
The replacement of the head of DPK proves the district gov-
ernment’s position regarding the management of sea turtle eggs.
DPK heads before him supported marine conservation in Berau.
The head of DPK of 2000–2005 supported the idea of the NGOs
to promote the sustainable management of marine and coastal
resources (Interview with former head of DPK 2000–2005) and
also his successor who chaired the DPK from 2005 to 2007.
Before 2006, when the district issued the regulation on the full
protection of sea turtles, the district government (through DPK)
set aside some of its budget for sea turtle conservation activities.
The budget came from the share of the taxes generated by the
district government from the sea turtle egg trade. When the trade
in eggs was declared illegal in the district, DPK lost control over
the conservation of the sea turtles.
The only way the Marine and Fisheries Agency knew of
‘doing conservation’ was by hatching the eggs that they re-
ceived from the leaseholder or pachter (Haji Penyu). So, after
2006, because of the invisibility of the trade, if they bought
eggs, it meant that they would support an illegal activity ac-
cording to national and international laws and regulations. Their
dilemma was also aggravated by the demise of the legal gov-
ernment–pachter contractual relationship; hence DPK was not
inclined to continue doing anything to ‘conserve’ the sea turtle.
Similarly, the Regional Planning Board (BAPPEDA) and the
Tourism Agency argued that before 2006 the district was actu-
ally more effective in turtle conservation.
Despite the full legal protection of sea turtles, all actors
including government officers of DPK, Regional Planning,
Tourism, the lease holder and even BKSDA believed that
sea turtle eggs encountered at the market in Samarinda were
still originating from Berau6. They recognized these
eggs by looking at their physical appearance; the eggs sold
from the Berau coastal area were mainly the eggs of the green
turtle, because their eggs are bigger than those of other spe-
cies. Still, egg sellers in Samarinda insisted that those ‘Berau’
eggs came from Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) or some-
times from a sea turtle hatchery in Pontianak (West
Kalimatan).
Thus, the kinship relationship between the head of the
Berau Fisheries department, Haji Penyu, and the vice-
chairman of local parliament clearly frustrated the implemen-
tation of marine conservation related activities in Berau. They
saw the MCA as an obstacle to their family interest in keeping
the concession. One of the Joint Program members stated:
[Haji Penyu’s brother] has a position as the vice-
chairman who is in charge of environmental affairs, in-
cluding fisheries. As long as he is in that position, I do
not expect that we would give any support [to imple-
ment] the MCA, especially for the budgeting, because
he is the one who has the power and authority to arrange
the budget for these affairs. [Even though] in my opin-
ion, Berau has the financial capacity to set apart a budget
for the monitoring of the Berau waters. (Member of
Joint Program, Tanjung Redeb, Berau, October 2011)
The Joint Program officers were annoyed when the district
government did not want to share the budget for the necessary
monitoring activities. One of the Joint Program officers who was
in charge of sea turtle conservation management argued that this
was because of the interests in local parliament (DPRD) who
were supporting sea turtle egg exploitation. He also suspected
that the district government of Berau would not contradict the
interests of Haji Penyu and his family. Despite this important role
of Haji Penyu that affected the implementation of the Berau
MCA, the Joint Program did not want to collaborate directly with
Haji Penyu. When they invited Haji Penyu to their meetings, he
was formally invited in his capacity as one of the village heads of
the coastal area of Berau. In other words, he was invited as a
passive ‘participant’ who was expected to only receive the Joint
Program’s messages instead of being a partner in a dialogue to
find a common ground for conservation practices. Moreover, the
Joint Program never recognized and valued his position as a
patron of his constituency, including the Berau government.
6 It is hard to find any formal data from the statistical bureau (BPS) related
to sea turtle exploitation after 2004. Neither Haji Penyu nor the district
marine agency had any responsibility anymore to monitor sea turtle ex-
ploitation or conservation. Besides, several informants in Berau said that
they had not recently seen any turtle eggs being traded in the local market.
But in Samarinda in 2010, it was easy to find sea turtle eggs traded openly
on the streets. For the Berau people it was difficult to understand and
caused jealousy concerningwhy others could continue trading turtle eggs,
while in Berau they could not because of conservation regulations.
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Discussion and Conclusion
The East Kalimantan case study presented in this paper supports
Sidel’s statement (2004) about the contestation and friction be-
tween networks of elite families who arewell represented in local
politics as well as in private sector economic enterprises, but we
question the assertion of a high turnover of power. The fluidity of
East Kalimantan’s coastal elite membership and involvement
seems to relatemore to their shifting resources than to their social
power over time (Kusumawati and Visser 2014; Obidzinski
2003).
The Beraumarine conservation case addresses the problem of
global environmental NGOs collaborating with, and including
the local political-administrative elite of Berau, yet at the same
time excluding the entrepreneurial elite, and particularly an infor-
mal leading figure like Haji Penyu. As a patron to both the
coastal villagers and the political elite, he is the real elite.
Unfortunately, the global environmentalists of TNC-WWF
completely ignored the role of Haji Penyu whose family had
obtained legitimacy as the historical lease-holder of rights to
control the harvesting of sea turtle eggs in Berau waters.
Because of the activities of Haji Penyu, the Joint Program posi-
tioned him as their rival in protecting the sea turtle, because the
Joint Program saw the high value, locally controlled turtle egg
trade as a threat to the sustainability of the sea turtle species.
The dilemma arising from the exclusion of the economic elite
from policy-making concerning the MCA and sea turtle conser-
vation is twofold. First, the international NGOs deprive them-
selves of access to existing local knowledge regarding sea turtles’
behavior and presence in the marine space of Berau. Second, the
declared illegality of the egg trade makes it become invisible,
going ‘under water’ in a sense, which makes protection difficult
to enforce for both local government and the environmental
NGOs represented in the Joint Program7.
This article concurs with Lund and Saito-Jensen (2013) that
studies of elite capture should be based on in-depth and longi-
tudinal empirical investigations. But it also acknowledges the
fact that project intervention is caught in legal and short-term
outcome oriented frames that severely hamper such an ap-
proach. Empirical anthropological research may help out here,
although scientists differ among themselves about solutions to
minimize the risk of elite capture. We have questioned the need
to sever the power relationships between patrons and their de-
pendents (Wong 2010; Labonte 2011) in the context of marine
and coastal resources governance in Berau, because such a
‘solution’ disregards the multiple social, economic and political
sources of a patron’s power. The Berau case clearly shows a
local governmental elite who participate in the same network
with an economic elite, both making use of the cultural and
historical legitimization of their access to power to govern sea
turtle egg exploitation (Kusumawati et al. 2013).
Like many other programs on community development
which avoid working directly with local patrons out of concern
that they would try to dominate and corrupt planning and gover-
nance (Platteau 2004; Dasgupta and Beard 2007; Alatas et al.
2013), the Joint Program also failed to actively engage in a dia-
logue with Haji Penyu in their MCA project in Berau. They
avoided collaborating with Haji Penyu as the informal leader
and member of the entrepreneurial elite of Berau because of
differing values and perceptions of marine and coastal resources
governance. However, when the Joint Program ignored the role
of Haji Penyu as a prominent member of the political-economic
elite of Berau, they indirectly eliminated the chances to collabo-
rate with the members of his network in the implementation of
the Berau MCA, including the most powerful members of the
local elite whowere patrons of a large coastal clientele, including
members of the local government. The result was that the Joint
Program as a foreign institution had no access to Haji Penyu’s
powerful and extensive political-economic network within and
beyond Berau district. Exclusion thus mainly served to sustain
the claim of the interventionists that the local elite frustrated their
project by ‘misusing project funds’, which in this case merely
meant acquiring private and public (district government) income
through maintaining a market in turtle eggs.
The point here is not the weakness of State legal frameworks.
The frameworks certainly are in place and known by the local
officials, but decentralization laws provide sufficient discretion-
ary room for the district head and the heads of government agen-
cies to escape from them in order to give priority to their eco-
nomic interests as members of local patronage networks.
Therefore, the crippling of conservation implementation is not
sufficiently explained by stating that the problem lies with weak
legal frameworks. Local government leaders turned a blind eye
to the turtle egg trade since they were clients of Haji Penyu. In
their view, the turtle egg trade was legitimate, even if illegal. Haji
Penyu developed his patronage networks to the extent that he and
his family could control the Berau district government. It started
with his brother who became the district parliament member for
Berau (DPRD); then his family business became one of the main
financial sponsors of one of the district head/vice-district head’s
joint candidature. Finally, his uncle became the head of the Berau
Department of Fisheries (DKP). This familial network strength-
ened Haji Penyu’s position vis à vis the NGOs. In other words,
the power of the social and political networks of Haji Penyu
immobilized DKP – being one of the most important partners
of the NGOs for implementing their marine conservation pro-
gram – in supporting themanagement of themarine conservation
area.
What do we learn from this case study? Elite capture is a label
often used by policy makers and scientists alike to address the
problem of ineffective project implementation. This case study
7 Part of the dilemma of the Joint Program partnership was, of course, that
the international NGOs as foreign guests of the Indonesian government,
had no power to curb rent seeking practices of the local governmental
elite receiving ‘gifts’ from their patron, the lease holder.
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has shown that successful implementation of the marine conser-
vation project in Berau was not hampered by an absence of rigid
NGO agendas or legal frameworks. Both the central and district
governments had a series of regulations in place for conservation
and the sustainable use of certain resources. The problem lies in
the implementation of those rules and regulations. There certain-
ly is no need to create new regulations, but to improve the social-
political conditions for implementing and strengthening them.
Sustainability of conservation efforts is therefore more a matter
of the social-political will to invest in obtaining better knowledge
of the networking of local political-administrative and economic
elites, particularly the interdependencies of government leaders
and officials and economic entrepreneurs who act as their pa-
trons. First, the efforts of the NGOs to create a legal set of reg-
ulations to strengthen the implementation of the Berau Marine
Conservation Area was of no avail because of their disinterest in
getting to know and understand the multiplicity of social, cultur-
al, economic and political conditions of MCA implementation.
Secondly, implementation ofmarine conservationwas obstructed
because the legal framework was at odds with the interests of the
local economic and political elites of the district. On the one
hand, key figures in local governmental institutions were not
prepared to disclose their involvement in economic networks,
including the trade of sea turtle eggs. On the other hand, neither
the NGOs nor the district government were prepared to actively
include Haji Penyu in the process of implementing their conser-
vation regulations. For example, by engaging in a positive debate
about balancing global scientific interests in conservation with
locally held views on resource extraction-cum-conservation by
monitoring sea turtle nesting and hatchlings.
In other words, assuming local elites’mismanagement to be a
fact, and taking the elite as a single social unit will not succeed in
solving the problem, because it overshadows the need to under-
stand the social, economic, cultural and political importance of
the patrons’ (punggawa) networks involving members of the
elite as well as non-elite members of their constituencies.
Instead of a generic critique of the role of local elites in capturing
project opportunities for their own benefit, policy makers and
project interventionists need to reframe and rephrase the issue
of elite capture into the question: ‘How to capture the elite?’
The key lesson learned fromBerauMCA case is that not only
the governmental elite is the key but also the local entrepreneurial
elite should be involved. It is not simply a matter of inviting a
patron (punggawa) like Haji Penyu as a passive participant to
conservation policy meetings. Also, his historical and cultural
knowledge and interests in the implementation of conservation
practices should be seriously considered in order to find an ef-
fective combination of local economic interests, values and local
knowledge as well as global scientific knowledge. Not only do
local communities depend on these patrons, NGOs also need
these patrons to access the local power networks. Meanwhile,
the economic patrons are part of regional, national and interna-
tional chains of power and resources that are often beyond the
scope of NGO intervention. In other words, inclusion of local
economic patrons provides conservation projects with access to
local environmental knowledge and resource extraction prac-
tices, that – if accepted as legitimate – provide greater transpar-
ency of the value chain of turtle eggs, in order to be properly
monitored in view of global conservation demands.
Fritzen (2007) warns that many projects may successfully
change institutional forms but not the cultural-historical norms
shaping the all-pervasive existence of public–private networks of
political and economic elites who share common resources and
territorial interests. This East Kalimantan case study shows that
indeed one important precondition to redress this bias is often
missing, namely the acknowledgement by institutional project
interventionists of the societal relevance of existing power net-
works and the recognition of the historical power and empirical
knowledge of such local entrepreneurial elites (Kusumawati et al.
2013; Kusumawati and Visser 2014). The international NGOs in
Berau did not seem inclined to take punggawa seriously as part-
ners in the implementation of their conservation projects. In fact,
the NGOs were falling victim to the idea of ‘elite capture’, in-
stead of trying to positively engage or capture not only the gov-
ernmental but also the economic elite, and to seek opportunities
to involve local communities by making use of the socially val-
ued patronage networks they depend on for accessing marine
resources and decision-making power.
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